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This essay warns that Nigel Biggar’s permissive reading of the classic, 
theological just war tradition is problematic especially when combined 
with his highly contextual approach to the United Nations Charter and 
laws of war. Two points are made: (1) As compared to Augustine’s 
grappling with the disordered loves of the Roman empire — including 
‘foreign iniquity’ as an excuse for military action, the animus dominandi, 
and wars of a kind that generate more war — In Defence of War lacks a 
political realism robust enough to defend against leaving the laws of war in 
the hands of the most powerful nations. (2) As compared to Augustine’s 
engagement with why and how secular law must constitute the conditions 
for peaceable and ordered co-existence, In Defence of War fails to 
incorporate into its just war reasoning a defence of the legal regime 
necessary for the protection of international peace and security. 
There is much in Nigel Biggar’s In Defence of War that I welcome and affirm, 
notably the need for those who stand within the classic, theologically Christian, 
narrowly penal, judicial tradition of just-war moral reasoning to refine that tradition 
and think with it afresh today. With Biggar, I want to defend and develop this 
tradition not only as viable but needed in our present-day context, despite the plethora 
of challenges to the effect that it is exhausted and unfit for the complexities of so-
called fourth- and fifth generation warfare, and more.  
To this end, it is necessary to be clear (as Biggar is crystal clear) that not all 
just-war reasoning is the same. Modern liberal versions look very different to the 
earlier tradition that runs from Ambrose and Augustine through Aquinas and beyond. 
It is necessary to have the debates that Biggar frames about why positive law is 
subject to a higher natural law, why retribution is not always contrary to the 
evangelical imperative to love, the difference between accepting that soldiers will 
sometimes have to kill and intending or wanting to kill, the complexities entailed in 
thinking with the classic just war tradition about recent and present-day conflicts, and 
more. In all these respects, I welcome In Defence of War as a significant contribution 
to this tradition and its refinement in the present-day. 
Yet questions must be asked about aspects of the book. I select two for 
comment: 
1. How does the realism that pervades In Defence of War compare to the 
political rhetoric of the City of God?  
2. Does Biggar’s contextualism with respect to interpretation of the laws of 
war lean too far toward flexibility in ways that undermine the legal 
regime in place to protect international peace and security?  
My differences with Biggar are those of the emphasis and interpretation of the early 
Christian just war tradition, not principle. But these emphases matter if Christian 
ethics and political theology today is to be sufficiently realist, that is, concerned with 
the restraint of wrong-doing and securing of things helpful to this life. 
Reading In Defence of War and The City of God Side-by-Side 
Augustine is, as Biggar affirms, ‘the leading patriarch of Christian just war doctrine’ 
(p. 61). More is required in just-war reasoning today, however, than thinking with 
merely the passages most familiar to expounders of the just war tradition — namely, a 
few chapters from Augustine’s The City of God and handful of letters in reply to 
Faustus the Manichaean and Marcellinus of Carthage, Aquinas’ answer to the 
question of war in four articles, and familiar writings by Francisca de Vitoria, 
Alberico Gentili, and Francisco Suarez.1 My point is not that Biggar advocates this 
kind of reductionism but that just-war reasoning requires broader-based engagement 
with Christian tradition than is familiar in just-war reasoning today, including what 
Augustine says about the politics and law of the Roman Empire. Time and again, 
Augustine holds up a mirror to the Empire to see where (at least partially) virtuous 
intent falls into excess, aggression, illegality and yet more war, and/or when it results 
in governance for those governed, taking counsel (L. consulere) with the elders, and 
seeking after just peace. We need Augustine’s alertness to when ordinate concerns 
(e.g., for present purposes, national security, the overcoming of wrong-doing and 
protection of the innocent) become vulnerable to degeneration into illegality, violence, 
the lust for domination, and other vices. Inattention to these aspects of the tradition 
risks present-day conclusions that are off-balance because incomplete. 
Rhetorical ‘Tools and Knives’2 
While attention has been paid to the rhetorical aspects of Confessions, the sermons 
and On Christian Doctrine, relatively few scholars have examined the political 
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rhetoric in the City of God. John von Heyking’s Augustine and Politics as Longing in 
the World is a noted exception that examines how Augustine heaps scorn on the 
pretensions of Rome’s leaders whilst analyzing simultaneously how the quest for 
glory that dominated Roman life decomposes into inordinate passions and warning 
believers against supposing that Christianity ‘has solved the problem of reconciling 
wisdom and power’.3 So, for instance, Heyking draws attention to how some of 
Augustine’s most extreme claims about the moral destitution of the Romans are made 
in relation to the glory they loved ardently: 
They chose to live for it, and they did not hesitate to die for it . . . It was, 
therefore, this avidity for praise and passion for glory that accomplished so 
many wonderous things; things which were doubtless praiseworthy and 
glorious in the estimation of men.4 
‘[B]ecause they did not love glory for the sake of justice, but seem rather to have 
loved justice for the sake of glory, they subsequently broke the treaty of peace which 
they had made’.5 The Roman quest for glory was not always reprehensible. But 
Augustine holds up a mirror to the empire to see where (at least partially) virtuous 
intent falls into excess, aggression, illegality and yet more war.  
Following Augustine’s lead, the challenge today is not to denounce concerns for 
security and the protection of nationals per se, or to exclude the debate about 
humanitarian intervention as falling outside the just-war tradition — this would be 
perverse — but to discern whether and/or when these (at least partially) virtuous 
endeavors tip into vice, notably, unlawfulness, the relaxation and expansion of long-
established rules to delimit the use of armed force, inattention to the due process of 
law, the prospect of perpetual war, and sometimes a mask for murder.  
Now the prominence of this desire in the character of the Romans is shown 
by the fact that the temples of the gods which they established in the closest 
proximity to one another were those of Virtue and Honour (for they took the 
gifts of God to be gods themselves).6 
Today, we do not build temples to Virtue and Honour but elevate certain concepts 
and/or principles, such as collective security and democracy, to the status of quasi-
religious symbols, the observance of which can substitute for government for the 
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international common good. As the miser forsakes justice out of his love for gold, the 
fault lies not with the gold but with the person if love of the gold is not properly 
subordinated to love of other goods.7 
Books IV and V of The City of God — in which Augustine considers most 
clearly the false gods worshipped by Rome during the period when God permitted the 
vast expansion and dominance of Empire — yield questions that also retain their 
relevance: Is peace preferable to war? Is victory sought for its own sake? Does 
‘foreign iniquity’ provide an excuse for military action?  
He prays ill, therefore, who desires to have someone to hate or to fear in 
order to have someone to conquer. … For we see that Foreign Iniquity has 
contributed much to the increase in the breadth of the empire, by making 
foreigners so unjust that they become peoples against whom just wars may 
be waged and the empire thereby enlarged.8 
Just-war reasoning today needs to hold questions about the ‘right cause’, ‘right 
authority’ and ‘right intention’ of armed conflict together with an Augustine-like 
knack for exposing the vices to which great political powers are vulnerable. 
On the Purpose of Law 
Relatedly, just-war reasoning needs due attention to the purpose of law. Augustine 
was not starry-eyed in his dealings with the law of empire. As bishop, he approached 
civil officials to intercede on behalf of debtors, got involved in day-to-day legal 
conflicts, commented on the duties of judges and how well they performed their role,9 
intervened according to the custom of the day to ask judges to mitigate the sentence 
and to punish more leniently than the laws commanded,10 offered suggestions about 
how mediation might take place between disputing claimants,11 as well as helping 
Christians settle disputes amongst themselves about the sale of goods, disputes over 
land, standards of evidence, and more.12 Pilgrims journeying toward the Heavenly 
City need the peace and security of secular order and so must obey the laws of the 
earthly city whereby the things necessary for the support of this mortal life are 
administered. He was clear that all the activities of civic life are enveloped in shadow 
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or darkness in the light of Civitas Dei.13 Nevertheless, laws properly enacted are for 
the protection of societies not the furtherance of political influence. The purpose of 
law is to establish and maintain ‘the tranquility of order’.14 
Politics East of Eden 
This brings us to an oft-neglected aspect of Augustine’s writings, namely, the demand 
of the political. Augustine is often held to have had such a low view of human law 
and politics after the fall that his theology of law is preoccupied with restraining 
disorder and lawlessness not the directing of societies toward peaceable living. His 
highlighting of the ‘sense of the tragic’ with respect to human nature means that he 
eschews the kind of utopian ideologies that were so destructive in the twentieth 
century’.15 There is a sense, however, in which, for Augustine, the natural and 
educative purpose of politics remains. In Eden, says Augustine, politics is the proper 
activity of rational beings seeking after their perfection: ‘creatures are instructed and 
learn, fields are cultivated, societies are governed, the arts are practiced, and other 
activities go on both in heavenly society and in this mortal society on earth’.16 The 
essence of politics proper is the bond of concord that unites Edenic human being as 
social: 
God therefore created only one single man: not, certainly, that he might be 
alone and bereft of human society, but that, by this means, the unity of 
society and the bond of concord might be commended to him more 
forcefully ….17 
Natural providence provides not only that humans live within the affection of kinship 
but also socially and politically. Voluntary providence, that is, which operates in the 
activities of humans (and angels) such that they may administer societies, practice the 
arts of healing, technology, education, and such like, under God. 
The contradiction of earthly government is that it is both instituted by God for 
some kind of ordering toward common good and imbued with violence from its birth. 
Augustine’s mournful telling of the history of Rome implies frequently that law’s 
violence is preferable to disorder and as a way of countering the manifestations of 
fallen human nature. Secular law must constitute the conditions for peaceable and 
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ordered co-existence, orienting all things toward ‘an ordered concord of civic 
obedience and rule in order to secure a kind of co-operation of men’s wills for the 
sake of attaining the things which belong to this mortal life’.18 Ensuring that law 
achieves this purpose requires constant vigilance because violence is at the core of 
earthly empire and no wishful thinking can erase this.  
Amidst the realities of global politics of his day, Augustine lifts our eyes from 
the many and valid reasons for deep scepticism about what human law can achieve to 
the human vocation to politics and possibility that law can still function beneficially 
in the restoration, maintenance and furtherance of peace. The true meaning of order, 
like justice, eludes human knowledge yet a pattern may be discerned in Augustine’s 
advocating of how the conditions for peaceable and ordered co-existence may be 
realized. Peace is referenced always to that which is greater than the immediate 
interests of a given individual, family or city: 
A man’s household, then, ought to be the beginning, or a little part, of the 
city: and every beginning has a reference to some end proper to itself, and 
every part has reference to the integrity of the whole of which it is a part. 
From this, it appears clearly enough that domestic peace has reference to 
civic peace: that is, that the ordered concord of domestic rule and obedience 
has reference to the ordered concord of civic rule and obedience. Thus, it is 
fitting that the father of a family should draw his own precepts from the law 
of the city, and rule his household in such a way that it is brought into 
harmony with the city’s peace.19 
The quality of peace varies. Even gangsters need some kind of peace in order to 
exploit ill-gotten gains: ‘Even he (a robber – EDR) maintains some shadow of peace, 
at least with those whom he cannot kill, and from whom he wishes to conceal his 
deeds’, from whence he would rise from his lair and raise himself up as a king if 
opportunity allowed.20 Augustine’s point, however, is that the violence of the state and 
its magistrates should be different to that of gangsters to the extent because it has a 
high threshold of necessity and is measured against the requirements of common good. 
The purpose of good law is peace, referenced always to the common or greater good. 
Biggar’s Contextualism 
This brings us to Biggar’s highly contextual approach to the United Nations Charter 
and the laws of war. Chapter 6 of In Defence of War is entitled: ‘On not always giving 
the Devil the benefit of law’ .... or, says Nigel, ‘if not quite the Devil, then, as some 
                                                
18 CG XIX, 17, p.945. 
19 CG XIX, 17, p.945. 
20 CG XIX, 12, p.934. 
argued in relation to the Kosovo war in 1999, Slobodan Milošević (p.219). Nigel 
faces head-on the question of whether, in this instance, international treaty law, 
strictly prohibited what it should not (p.223). Few will dispute the notion that an 
unjust law is no law.21 But that’s not quite the point at issue. Biggar asks not about 
laws that are unjust per se but about whether and/or when to override laws which 
prohibit action that might be deemed morally desirable, given political processes at 
the UN that might stymy action to authorize such action. Instances are given when the 
Charter’s rule of non-intervention and absence of a doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention has been viewed widely as meaning that ‘international treaty law, strictly 
read, prohibits what it should not’ (p.223). In tracking debate between Ian Brownlie 
and Richard Lillich, the chapter frames a struggle between ‘textualist’ and 
‘contextualist’ lawyers for the true meaning of international law. Biggar makes his 
own position clear with reference specifically to the controversy about Kosovo: ‘I do 
not believe that the meaning of international law lies in texts as distinct from their 
context. What the UN Charter means must be understood in terms of the historical 
context of its origin’ (p.227).  
I accept with Biggar that account must be taken of context in any interpretation 
of (quasi-)legal principles and texts. The UN Charter was written in a particular 
historical-cultural context at a time when a particular complex of political and 
otherwise evaluative convictions contributed to its formation. As a matter of principle, 
I accept that there are instances when individuals and states might have to act outside 
the law. But to leave the matter here risks leaving the framing of international law to 
those with most to gain. Whether or not we agree that NATO’s 1999 intervention in 
Kosovo was morally right, my concern is that Biggar’s defence of war lacks equal 
consideration for the political processes whereby laws for the constraint of war and 
mitigation of its horrors are contested. Defence of war requires equal concern for 
defence of the legal regime governing the use of force by regional security 
organizations.  
At issue is whether Biggar defence of war is matched by equal care for the laws 
of war. While Biggar’s permissive reading of the classic, theological just war tradition 
yields several conclusions with which I am uncomfortable, this essay has attempted to 
draw attention to the inseparability of Augustine’s questions about disordered 
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political ‘loves’ from the more familiar questions of  ‘right cause’, ‘right authority’ 
and ‘right intention’. Reading Augustine reminds us that political ‘loves’ still 
determine not only decisions to engage in armed conflict but also international law as 
an instrument of influence for the dominant powers and/or a means of giving voice to 
the terrorized and vulnerable; a means of disseminating the values of the most 
powerful states and/or instrument for holding the most powerful to account. It is 
concerning that Biggar treats legal constraints on the use of military force under the 
‘Aunt Sally’ heading ‘The prospects of global government’ (p.241), i.e., a quasi-
apocalyptic notion of a single common political authority for all humanity that is not a 
serious political option, thereby deflecting attention from the need for laws to restrain 
and regulate armed conflict, and failing adequately to expose the political ‘loves’ of 
great world powers in the determination of the laws of war.  
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